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Abstract— In today’s society where we live in a world of 
constant connectivity, many people are now looking to cloud 
services in order to store their files so they can have access to them 
wherever they are. By using cloud services, users can access files 
anywhere with an internet connection. However, while cloud 
storage is convenient, it also presents security risks. From a 
forensics perspective, the increasing popularity of cloud storage 
platforms, makes investigation into such exploits much more 
difficult, especially since many platforms such as mobile devices as 
well as computers are able to use these services. This paper presents 
investigation of hubiC as one of popular cloud platforms running 
on Microsoft Windows 8.1. Remaining artefacts pertaining 
different usage of hubiC namely upload, download, installation and 
uninstallation on Microsoft Windows 8.1are presented.  
Keywords— Cyber Investigation; Cloud Forensics; hubiC 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Cloud Computing may be defined as "a model for enabling 
ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, 
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be 
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction." [1] and has provided a 
powerful platform for criminal use [2]. It has been  used to 
store, share and transfer malicious content. Ergo, 
investigations of cloud platforms rise as a priority for forensic 
experts. Investigation of cloud storage services poses new 
challengesarising from the federated nature of information 
which presents multiple  legal issues [3].   
Utilizing a forensics investigation to analyze Amazon S3, 
Dropbox, Evernote and Google Docs on Motorola Droid with 
Android v2.2.2, iPhone 4 with iOS v4.3.5, Mac and Windows 
Machines [4] identified a variety of digital remnants 
including; username, downloaded and uploaded filenames. 
Moreover, investigations of Dropbox, Google Docs, 
PicasaWeb and Flicker,carried out on Windows 7 PCs,  have 
recovered artefacts of web browser and desktop applications 
[5]. Dykstra and Sherman analysed export features of Amazon 
EC2 to illustrate a cloud evidence collection method using 
different forensics tools such as EnCase and AccessData FTK 
[6]. Hale also recovered a variety of artifacts, such as the 
installation path and registry modifications [7], from an 
Amazon cloud drive on Windows XP when analyzing both 
server and client sides of a private cloud storage service [9], 
authentications credentials, file contents and timestamps were 
found, allowing for the full recovery of server files. Oother 
investigations, highlighted that, despite the challenge of 
obtaining logs from cloud services, these services held 
substantial worth to a forensic investigator [11] and a tool was 
provided for accessing the logs on a cloud service.  
Martini and Choo proposed a collection process, consisting of 
six steps, for investigating VMware vCloud and showed that 
by using vCloud’s REST API, a variety of evidential data 
could be collected [14]. Similarly, a cloud data imager was 
developed to collect evidences from Google Drive, Dropbox 
and Skydrive [15], providing interaction (browsing and 
imaging) with folder trees. 
Google Drive was employed as a case study to test and 
demonstrate a forensic analysis framework [16]. This was 
subsequently tested against SkyDrive [17], Dropbox [18], 
SugarSync [19] and UbuntuOne [13] cloud services. 
A summary of cloud storage forensic research is outlined 
in Table I. 
TABLE I.  A SNAPSHOT OF EXISTING CLOUD FORENSICS RESEARCH  
General Cloud 
Research 
Public cloud Private cloud 
Mell & Grance [1] 
Daryabar et al. [2]  
Damshenas et al [3] 
Chung et al. [4] 
Marturana et al. [5] 
Dykstra & Sherman 
[6] 
Martini & Choo [9] 
Wen et al. [10] 
Zawoad et al [11] 
Martini & Choo 
[14] 
Dezfoli et al. [20] 
Daryabar et al. [21] 
Damshenas [22] 
Amazon Cloud Drive [7] 
XtreemFS [12] 
Ubuntu One [13] 
Dropbox, Google Drive 
and Microsoft SkyDrive 
[15] 
Google Drive [16] 
Skydrive [17] 
 
 
Dropbox, Box and 
Sugarsync [8] 
Dropbox [18] 
Sugarsync [19] 
 
 
hubiC is a rapidly growing cloud storage service, created by 
OVH (On Vous Héberge) at the end of 2011. This cloud 
service celebrated 500,000 unique users on 27th March 2015, 
with ambitions to achieve 1,000,000 users by 2020. hubiC was 
originally solely available to users in France until 2013, after 
which the ability to register accounts for international users 
was offered. However, literature suggestes that investigation 
of hubiC as a cloud storage platform has been left untouched. 
Therefore, the research reported here aims to provide insight 
into the remnants of data left behind by the hubiC cloud 
service on Windows 8.1 (the current active, stable mass 
consumer operating system). This research paper aims to 
answer following questions: 
 What data can be recovered on the hard drive of a 
Windows 8.1 machine after the use of the hubiC cloud 
storage service?  
 What data can be recovered from the physical memory 
(RAM) of a Windows 8.1 machine after the use of the 
hubiC cloud storage service?  
 What data is transmitted in the network traffic during 
communication with the hubiC cloud storage service 
during the upload and download of files? 
The following sections present the research experiment setup, 
followed by detailed discussion of detected remnants. The 
paper concludes providing a summativereview of findings and 
proposals of future works.   
II. EXPERIMENT SETUP 
The experiment was conducted over various VMs. A base VM 
was created, containing a clean installation of Windows 
8.1.9.3.9600. This VM was then cloned to the following VMs: 
The Access VM (1.1) – To detect remnants of accessing and 
logging into hubiC via the web browser. 
The Upload VM (1.2) – To investigate evidences of 
uploading files to hubiC. 
Download/Open VM (1.3) – To detect evidences during the 
downloading and opening of a file from the web browser. 
Delete VM (1.4) – Investigating file remnants left behind 
when a file is deleted via the web browser. 
Install Desktop VM (1.5) – Searching for evidences after 
installation of the hubiC desktop application. 
Upload Desktop VM (1.5.1) – Searching for file remnants 
after upload of a test file via the hubiC desktop application. 
Uninstall Desktop VM (1.5.1.1) – Searching for evidences of 
hubiC desktop application existence and test files. 
Download Desktop VM (1.5.2) – Investigating evidences 
available after using hubiC desktop application to download a 
test file. 
Delete Desktop VM (1.5.2.1) – Searching for file remnants 
after deleting test file using hubic desktop application. 
Internet Explorer v11.0.9600.16384, Google Chrome 
v40.0.2214.115 and Mozilla Firefox v35.0.1 were used during 
web-browser based experiments. When using Chrome, 
ChromeCacheView V1.66 was used to view data remnants left 
behind when accessing the hubiC website. Additionally, the 
HxD hex editor V1.7.7.0 was used for the memory forensics 
portion of the investigation. Email 22 from the 
/maildir/delainey-d/inbox directory of the Enron email 
dataset(http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~enron/)( 10/04/2015), was 
used to upload to the hubiC server. The network traffic was 
investigated using Wireshark 1.12.4.  
III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, results of investigating the Access VM (1.1), 
Upload VM (1.2), Download/Open VM (1.3), Delete VM 
(1.4), Install Desktop VM (1.5), Upload Desktop VM (1.5.1), 
Uninstall Desktop VM (1.5.1.1), Download Desktop VM 
(1.5.2) and Delete Desktop VM (1.5.2.1), including memory 
forensics and analysis of temporary and log files, which 
provide insight into the internal operations of hubiC are 
presented. Network monitoring was also conducted during 
these investigations. 
A. Network Traffic Analysis 
During analysis of the network traffic, it was observed that 
when the initial request was made to www.hubic.com, a 
redirect to https on port 8080 was returned. This indicates that 
there is no plaintext traffic accepted by the hubiC website, a 
subsequent redirection response is then sent, with the status 
code 302 (moved temporarily), which finally redirects to 
https://www.hubic.com/en. 
All communication between the hubiC client and server 
applications was encrypted using TLSV1, preventing 
successful extraction of data of any sniffed traffic. Therefore, 
no clear indication of the e-mail address or the password could 
be detected within the login stream. Once login was 
completed, a session id was created, although this was not 
saved into the cookies. This value was a combination of 
“hubiC.com” and a timestamp. All involved domain names 
and their respective IP address were analyzed. Most of the IP 
addresses did not have an available DNS mapping. During 
analysis, we managed to infer the certificate type, by 
following the TCP packets in transit using Wireshark as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Certificate Data 
During uninstallation, packets were found to be exchanged 
with the hubiC server. The TCP conversation revealed that 
there was no communication between the hubiC client and 
server during the uninstallation process, indicating that all 
changes were performed locally. 
During the upload of the file, hubiC communicated with 
37.59.76.98, which, again, is an OVH server without a 
domain. Initiation of upload traffic streams are tagged with 
“hubiC.ovh.net” as shown in Figure 2. Investigation of 
uploaded traffic shows utilization of compression algorithms 
before files are sent. For example, corresponding stream of a 
1318 bytes uploaded file was just 1307 bytes.  
 
 
 
Figure 2 – hubiC string in TCP stream. 
 
During the upload, a GIF file was found that was named 
“prepareUpload.gif”. This provided information about what 
was happening during the usage of the machine, but did not 
present any information about the file itself.  
 
B. Analysis of Access VM (1.1) 
During analysis of the Access VM (1.1), the browser cache 
was used to attempt to obtain knowledge of when the access 
occurred, along with temporary internet files (such as 
browsing history and cookies). Using the Chrome cache 
viewer, Javascript, HTML and Image files were obtained that 
were downloaded during transactions with the hubiC browser 
interface (Figure 3). Analysis also revealed the e-mail address 
and password of the user that was used to log in to hubiC 
(Figure 4). This was found within the process memory of 
Internet Explorer using “password” as a keyword, by 
searching directly through the memory using HxD hex editor. 
Additionally, a remnant of the page title was found in memory 
(Figure 5). 
 
C. Analysis of Upload VM (1.2) 
For VM 1.2 the remnants that were left behind during the 
uploading of a file. via the web browser, to the hubiC server, 
were analysed.  
 
SHA1 checksums of the file before and after the upload were 
exactly the same.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Example of content in CacheMemory 
 
 
Figure 4 - E-Mail address and password of the user in memory 
 
 
Figure 5 – Page title found in memory 
 
Searching through the chrome cache files in 
%USERPROFILE%/AppData/Roaming/Google/Chrome led to 
detection of an additional “prepareUpload.gif”  file. Opened 
this file in a hex editor revealed that the image was a single 
pixel only. Examining the bytes of this GIF file did not reveal 
any relevant information hidden inside the image, or inside the 
image slack space. When the website was accessed from 
Google Chrome it is clear, from the system memory, that files 
were deposited in the chrome local storage folder with clear 
indication that the data resulted from accessing hubic.com. 
In the metadata of the file, the e-mail file had the original 
created date. After the upload, the file was then analyzed to 
check if these values have been changed. The same file 
displayed no change to the metadata of the file, including last 
accessed timestamp. 
Memory analysis of the upload VM revealed the uploaded file 
was available in the process space of Internet Explorer.  
 
D. Analysis of Download/Open VM (1.3) 
The first assessment performed was the hash comparison. The 
hash comparison matches indicated that the contents of the file 
had not been changed during the download process. The file 
metadata was then compared with the original. As expected, , 
both the date created and date accessed were the time that the 
file was downloaded to the disk, however the date modified 
field was set to two seconds after.  
During the memory analysis, the downloaded file was found 
in multiple locations. The first location represented the file 
that was loaded into memory by Internet Explorer during the 
download (the same file was not found on all other browsers),. 
the second copy located on the hard disk. These file locations 
were as expected. 
 
E. Analysis of Delete VM (1.4) 
The bulk of the analysis came from investigation into the 
cache. While most browsers did not cache any files pertinent 
to communication with the hubiC web client, beyond HTML 
fragments, the Chrome Cache contained references to a gif 
file. In this instance, the file was named “delete”. This file was 
uploaded when the delete command was sent to the server. 
 
F. Analysis of Install Desktop VM (1.5) 
Using regedit.exe, the registry of the Install VM was scanned 
to find references to hubiC post installation. An assessment 
into the registry found entries at 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/OVH/hubiC-sync. After 
install, logs were present in AppData/Local/Temp. The names 
of these log files contained the time when installation was 
performed. The only configuration file of hubiC 
(hubiC.exe.config) was located at 
%programfiles%\OVH\hubiC. This file indicated some basic 
setup for how the application should parse the URL.  
G. Analysis of Upload Desktop VM (1.5.1) 
The first stage was to obtain the process ID of the hubiC 
process. This was discovered using Resource Monitor. Once 
the application was started up, the log files were assessed to 
find relevant changes. The logs written to during installation 
were not changed, but new logs were created in the 
AppData/Roaming/hubiC folder. This folder contained the 
application.txt file, the log file, and hubiC.db file. hubiC.db 
was an SQLite file. This file was subsequently opened using 
the Firefox plugin SQLite Manager 0.8.3. An assessment of 
this database before an upload had occurred showed a 
collection of empty tables. These tables were named 
backupDirs, backupFileVersions, backupFiles, files, 
localHashCache, remoteHashCache and synchronizedDirs. 
This file was then uploaded and the state of the SQLite DB 
was monitored. After logging in to the hubiC client 
application, a new database was made named “hubiC.db-
journal”. Initially, hubiC.db was analysed. Data was now 
found in the files. Data was also found in the 
synchronizedDirs table as shown in Figure 6. 
     
Figure 6 – New entry in table 
Once a hubiC directory was chosen, three separate locations 
were placed into the files table. These folders corresponded to 
folders on the hubiC cloud server, indicating synchronization. 
When attempting to access the hubiC.journal-db, an error 
message was presented, indicating that the database file was 
either encrypted or corrupted. To combat this, the file was 
carved using a hex editor, however the encryption remained. 
As a way to glean information from this, the bytes were 
analyzed in an attempt to calculate the structure of the 
database table and identify any data contained. DDL syntax 
was found, indicating the structure of the database. This DDL 
syntax seemed to create the files table, in the same structure as 
found in the hubiC.db file. 
An analysis of the file metadata revealed that there was no 
change to the original file during the upload process. Registry 
files were also observed during the upload process. The login 
details used are clearly stored at 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER/Software/OVH/hubiC-sync. The key 
“AccountEmail” contains the reference to the email address of 
the logged in user, along with SecureAuthToken, which is an 
oAuth 2.0 secure token, granting the hubiC software access to 
the API. 
Memory analysis was again carried out on the virtual machine 
using a hex editor. Within this, the e-mail address used to log 
into the application was discovered as shown in Figure 7. In 
addition to this, the name of the file uploaded to the hubiC 
server was found in memory. 
 
Figure 7 – Email account found in memory 
 
H. Analysis of Uninstall Desktop VM (1.5.1.1) 
The uninstallation was performed using the Windows 
uninstaller: hubiC does not have its own uninstaller 
application. 
Analysis of the log files stored in AppData/Local/Temp 
revealed they were not removed during the uninstallation 
process; however they contained no information within them 
about the application being uninstalled. All Registry entries 
and hubiC.db and hubiC.db-journal files were removed during 
the uninstallation process, with the exception of the 
application.txt file, which was located in 
AppData/Local/Temp.  
The sync folder ( C:\Users\Alice\hubiC\), was left untouched 
and all files remained intact, without change to their metadata. 
Program installation was deleted from the C:\Program Files 
directory. 
During the analysis of the memory, the e-mail address of the 
user was found in the memory of the current machine state. 
 
I. Analysis of Download Desktop VM (1.5.2) 
The previously discovered log files and database files were 
analysed for notable changes that could pertain to the current 
activity. Additionally, the file was hashed before upload to the 
server, on a different machine, and hashed after download, to 
compare content. Analysis of the metadata, of the test file, 
revealed the date created field was the time when the file was 
uploaded to the server originally, but the access date matched 
the time of file synchronisation during the download.  
Assessing the content of the hubiC.db file, after download 
completion, resulted in a new recored contained within the 
files table. This new file identifier, at ID 4, represented the test 
file used. This indicates that the hubiC.db file is a constant 
database representation of the contents of the sync folder. 
Comparing the file hashes, showed no change to the original 
file contents during the download process. 
During the analysis of the logs, in the application.txt file in 
AppData/Roaming/hubiC, there were entries reporting on 
directories created as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 – Logs indicating folder creation 
 
During analysis of the memory of the download VM, the 
downloaded file was found contained in memory, with some 
stray bits added. 
J. Analysis of Delete Desktop VM (1.5.2.1) 
Assessing contents of the log files showed records of the 
deletion were available in the Application.txt file 
(AppData/Roaming/hubiC). When the test file was deleted 
from the sync folder, it was moved to the recycle bin, by effect 
of hubiC ustilising Windows Explorer to enact this deletion. 
Additionally, when the deletion occurs, hubiC updates the 
hubiC.db file located in AppData/Roaming/hubiC. During the 
memory analysis of the delete VM, the deleted file was found 
four times in the memory. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
In reference to the initial questions posted in the introduction, 
the following answers were gained.  
The data found on the hard drive provided insight into the 
inner workings of the hubiC application. The Chrome Cache 
Viewer enabled file remnants to be obtained during the use of 
the hubiC web client. Username and password of the active 
user were found in the hubiC process memory. Additionally, 
the test file, deleted from the hubiC cloud service, was found, 
after deletion. An analysis of the network traffic provided 
insight into the communication occurring between the hubiC 
client and server, giving IP addresses of the hubiC servers and 
the security system used, TLSV1. These present significant 
risks to the secure use of the hubiC system both while the 
client is installed and after it has been uninstalled. 
Direct future applications of this research could apply simular 
methodlogy to the investigation of other cloud platforms, (e.g. 
ADrive, eCloud, etc) on Windows 8.1. This would increase 
the scope of the investigation and provide greater insight to an 
investigator, potentially revealing common flaws across 
several cloud platforms. Extending this common approach to 
applications of other catagories of forensics techniques such as 
cloud malware forensics [23-27], mobile device cloud 
applications forensics [28,29], social network platforms 
investigation on cloud systems [30, 31], and cyber-crime and 
cyberwar investigation techniques in cloud environments 
[32,33] would expland this to a comprehensive body of 
knoweledge. Finally, as forensics investigation process may 
reveal many private data [36,37], it is important to consider 
privacy effects of forensics investigation in cloud 
environments in future works.   
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